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COMMONWEALTH V. RUNYAN: SAFE 
STORAGE LAWS IN THE CROSSFIRE OF 
SECOND AMENDMENT LITIGATION 
Abstract: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 2010 decision in 
Commonwealth v. Runyan upheld a state law requiring firearms to be se-
curely locked when not in the possession of a legally authorized user. The 
court ruled that the Second Amendment does not apply against the states 
and that the safe storage law does not infringe upon an individual’s right 
to bear arms for self-defense. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling that 
the Second Amendment is incorporated against the states via the Four-
teenth Amendment has cast the validity of Runyan into doubt. This Case 
Comment argues that the safe storage law implicated in Runyan does not 
infringe upon the rights protected by the Second Amendment as inter-
preted in recent Supreme Court decisions and concludes that the safe 
storage laws of other states—which are all less restrictive than the Massa-
chusetts statute—remain constitutional. 
Introduction 
 For most of U.S. history, the Supreme Court rarely considered 
whether the Second Amendment1 substantially curtails the ability of 
state legislatures to restrict the ownership and use of firearms, as the 
Second Amendment was not deemed applicable to the states.2 Relying 
on nineteenth-century Supreme Court precedents, which held that the 
Second Amendment did not limit the powers of the states, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the “SJC”) decided in the 2010 case 
Commonwealth v. Runyan that the Second Amendment does not limit 
the state’s power to enforce laws restricting the use and ownership of 
guns.3 Only three months after Runyan was decided, its primary hold-
                                                                                                                      
1 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. 
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008) (explaining, in dictum, 
why the Court had not previously determined the full scope of the Second Amendment). 
3 See Commonwealth v. Runyan, 922 N.E.2d 794, 797–98 (Mass. 2010) (citing Miller v. 
Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894), abrogated by McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (plurality opinion); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), abrogated by McDon-
ald, 130 S. Ct. 3020; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875), abrogated by 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020) (holding, based on the plain language of cited Supreme Court 
precedents, that the Second Amendment does not limit the powers of states), abrogated by 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020. 
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ing was invalidated by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
which incorporated the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4 McDonald made the Second Amendment’s guarantee of 
an individual right to bear arms for self-defense fully applicable against 
the states.5 The Massachusetts safe storage statute at issue in Runyan 
imposes criminal liability on gun owners who fail to store their firearms 
in locked containers or bound by trigger locks when not in the control 
of an authorized user. Perhaps anticipating the incorporation of the 
Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, the SJC stated 
in dicta that the statute complies with the Second Amendment because 
the law allows an individual to bear arms for self-defense in the home.6 
 In his dissent from the McDonald decision, Justice Stevens warned 
that the application of the Second Amendment to the states would “in-
vite[] an avalanche of litigation that could mire the federal courts in 
fine-grained determinations about which state and local regulations 
comport with the Heller right—the precise contours of which are far 
from pellucid—under a standard of review we have not even estab-
lished.”7 The safe storage statute analyzed in Runyan is currently the 
most restrictive in the nation.8 This Comment asserts that this statute 
likely remains constitutional after McDonald, and it is, therefore, unlike-
ly that other states’ safe storage laws will be held invalid if challenged 
during this Second Amendment “avalanche.”9 
 Part I of this Comment describes the facts of Runyan and reason-
ing behind the court’s decision that the Second Amendment is inappli-
cable against the states.10 Part II analyzes the constitutionality of the 
                                                                                                                      
4 Compare Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 797–98 (holding on March 10, 2010 that the Second 
Amendment is not applicable to the states), with McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (holding on 
June 28, 2010 that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the states). Justices Alito, 
Roberts, Kennedy, and Scalia agreed that the Second Amendment was sufficiently “funda-
mental from an American perspective” to be incorporated under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. In contrast, Justice Thomas 
believed that the Second Amendment would be applicable to the states only under his 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 
3059 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
5 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
6 See 922 N.E.2d at 799–800 (in dicta, distinguishing the Massachusetts statute from the 
statute struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller and 
concluding that the Massachusetts statute allows for an individual to engage in lawful self-
defense); see also infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
7 130 S. Ct. at 3115 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
8 See infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
9 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3115 (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra notes 79–88 and ac-
companying text. 
10 See infra notes 13–30 and accompanying text. 
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Massachusetts safe storage statute in light of McDonald’s incorporation 
of the Second Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.11 Finally, Part III discusses the validity of safe storage laws 
of other states.12 
I. Runyan Before Incorporation of the Second Amendment 
 Runyan was decided by the Massachusetts SJC on March 10, 2010, 
nearly two years after the U.S. Supreme Court decided District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, which had interpreted the Second Amendment as granting 
an individual right to bear arms, and only three months before the Su-
preme Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago, which would incorpo-
rate the Second Amendment against the states.13 This was a particularly 
confusing period in Second Amendment jurisprudence, as on the one 
hand it was clear that the Supreme Court was prepared to interpret the 
right to bear arms far more broadly than it had in the past.14 On the 
other hand, it was unclear exactly how broad the right would become— 
even to members of the Supreme Court.15 Taking advantage of this op-
portunity, gun rights advocates petitioned the SJC in Runyan to treat the 
Second Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, 
so that Massachusetts would be forced to recognize an individual right 
to bear arms for self-defense.16 As the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights guarantees only a collective right to bear arms for the common 
                                                                                                                      
11 See infra notes 31–67 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 68–88 and accompanying text. 
13 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008); Commonwealth v. Runyan, 922 
N.E.2d 794, 798 (Mass. 2010). 
14 Compare Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1980) (upholding a statute pro-
hibiting felons from possessing weapons because it is supported by some rational basis), 
and United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (suggesting that the Second Amend-
ment must be interpreted in relation to its purpose to maintain militias), with Heller; 554 
U.S. at 595, 622, 628 n.27 (recognizing an individual right to bear arms unconnected with 
militia service and rejecting rational basis review in Second Amendment cases). 
15 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (dictum in response to dissenting justices) (“[S]ince this 
case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one 
should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”); cf. id. at 720–22 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(questioning how judges will apply the majority’s analysis of the Second Amendment’s 
scope, and warning that all gun control laws will be jeopardized). 
16 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. & Gun Owners Ac-
tion League in Support of Appellee at 15, Runyan, 922 N.E.2d 794 (No. SJC-10480) (argu-
ing that incorporation of the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment was a 
foregone conclusion after Heller, despite the lack of a Supreme Court decision at the time 
so holding). 
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defense,17 the court in Runyan was forced to decide if the Second 
Amendment is applicable to the states and, if so, whether the Massachu-
setts law governing the safe storage of firearms violates the Amend-
ment’s more expansive right to bear arms.18 
 The procedural and factual background of the Runyan case is not 
complex.19 While investigating a report of “BBs” being shot through a 
neighbor’s window, police officers searched the home of Richard Run-
yan and found two soft gun-carrying cases under the defendant’s bed.20 
One case contained a shotgun secured with a trigger lock, but the 
other contained an unsecured semiautomatic hunting rifle.21 Runyan 
was charged under a Massachusetts statute imposing criminal liability 
for failing to store a firearm in a locked container or bound by a trigger 
lock when not in the control of a lawfully authorized user.22 Assuming 
that the Second Amendment applied to the states as a matter of sub-
                                                                                                                      
17 See Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 798 & n.5 (citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 
(Mass. 1976)) (recognizing that the Massachusetts Constitution provides only for the com-
mon defense and does not limit the legislature’s authority to enact the safe storage statute); 
Davis, 343 N.E.2d at 848–49 (stating that the Massachusetts Constitution provides only a col-
lective right to bear arms for the common defense); cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (interpreting 
the federal constitution to include an individual right to bear arms for self-defense). The 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states: 
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. 
And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be 
maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall 
always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be gov-
erned by it. 
Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. 17. 
18 See 922 N.E.2d at 796, 797, 798–99 (reciting the defendant’s claim that the safe stor-
age statute was unconstitutional, that the trial court’s dismissal of the charge against him 
was based on an erroneous assumption that the Second Amendment applied to the states, 
and that the statute at issue conflicted with the Second Amendment). 
19 See infra notes 20–30 and accompanying text. 
20 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 796. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 795, 796. The Massachusetts safe storage statute reads: 
It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm, rifle or shotgun including, 
but not limited to, large capacity weapons, or machine gun in any place un-
less such weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-
resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly engaged so as to 
render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the owner or other 
lawfully authorized user. For purposes of this section, such weapon shall not 
be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or 
other lawfully authorized user. 
Mass Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131L(a) (2008) 
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stantive due process,23 the trial judge dismissed the charge, finding that 
the Massachusetts statute was indistinguishable from the firearm stor-
age statute struck down in Heller.24 On direct appellate review,25 the 
SJC, relying on several nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions,26 
decided that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states and 
vacated the dismissal.27 The SJC acknowledged that the cases were weak 
precedent, as they were decided before the Supreme Court began to 
incorporate selectively portions of the Bill of Rights into the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus did not address 
that doctrine.28 Confronted with a circuit split on incorporation of the 
Second Amendment,29 the SJC held that the Amendment does not ap-
ply to the states, stating that the nineteenth-century cases remained 
binding precedent until the Supreme Court decided otherwise.30 
II. Runyan After Incorporation of the Second Amendment 
 Perhaps anticipating the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court 
would decide otherwise and apply the Second Amendment to state 
firearm regulations,31 the SJC stated in dicta in Runyan that the Massa-
                                                                                                                      
23 See Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 797 (noting that the trial judge’s decision must have relied 
on such an assumption). 
24 Id. at 795–96. 
25 Id. at 796 (noting that the Commonwealth filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, 
and the SJC granted direct appellate review of the trial court’s decision). 
26 See cases cited supra note 3 (stating that the Second Amendment limits only federal, 
not state, action). 
27 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 798, 800. 
28 See id. at 797–98 (citing NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)) (recognizing that 
Cruikshank was decided before the Supreme Court decided selectively to incorporate the 
Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause, and therefore did not discuss whether the right 
to bear arms was sufficiently fundamental to be incorporated). 
29 Compare NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d at 857 (Second Amendment not incorpo-
rated into Fourteenth), and Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009) (per cu-
riam) (same), vacated sub nom. Maloney v. Rice, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010), with Nordyke v. 
King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009) (Second Amendment incorporated into Due Proc-
ess Clause), vacated and remanded 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). 
30 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 798. 
31 See Commonwealth v. Runyan, 922 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Mass. 2010) (citing NRA v. City 
of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)), and thus recognizing the Supreme Court would be reviewing the 
decision). The Supreme Court oral argument for McDonald, held only eight days before 
the SJC released the Runyan decision, focused on the possible incorporation of the Second 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 794 (stating that Runyan was de-
cided on March 10, 2010); Transcript of Oral Argument passim, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(No. 08-1521) (discussing on March 2, 2010 the possibility of incorporating the Second 
Amendment). 
248 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
chusetts safe storage law complies with the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2008 case District 
of Columbia v. Heller.32 Because the Supreme Court recently held in the 
2010 case McDonald v. City of Chicago that the Second Amendment is 
fully applicable against the states, the continued validity of the SJC’s 
decision in Runyan depends entirely upon this dicta.33 
 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, in both Heller and McDonald, 
gave the lower courts relatively little guidance to determine when a 
statute violates the Second Amendment, and what standard of judicial 
scrutiny should be used in this inquiry.34 Although the majority in Hel-
ler expressly rejected the use of rational basis scrutiny or an interest-
balancing test,35 the Court did not appear to adopt a standard of strict 
scrutiny.36 This has led some federal circuit courts to apply intermedi-
ate scrutiny to alleged violations of the Second Amendment.37 
 Other courts and commentators believe that the Supreme Court 
will eventually adopt a framework similar to that used in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, which allows categorical limitations to the consti-
tutional right.38 Justice Scalia seemed to suggest this possibility in his 
                                                                                                                      
 
32 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 799–800. In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms for self-defense in the home. 554 
U.S. 570, 595, 628–29 (2008). 
33See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (holding that the Second Amendment is fully appli-
cable against the states). 
34 See Ryan L. Card, Note, An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to 
Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause 
Headaches for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 259, 260 
(2009) (suggesting that the Court did not adopt any particular standard and may have re-
jected all possible ones); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Frame-
work Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1535, 1537 (2009) (stating that 
lower courts adjudicating Second Amendment cases received little explicit guidance from 
Heller); see also John W. Whittlesey, Note, Second-Amendment Scrutiny: Firearm Enthusiasts May 
Win the Battle but Ultimately Lose the War in District of Columbia v. Heller, 58 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 1423, 1430–48 (2008) (reviewing possible scrutiny standards in detail). 
35 554 U.S. at 628 n.27, 634–35; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (reaffirming rejec-
tion of an interest-balancing approach). 
36 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s 
broad categorical exclusions of certain weapons and citizens from the Second Amendment 
right may not survive constitutional review under true strict scrutiny). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny but not creating a uniform rule); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
85, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny but recognizing that other fire-
arm laws may require different standards of review). 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that 
categorical disqualifications from Second Amendment rights are permissible, as for First 
Amendment rights, when supported by a strong showing that the statute is related to an 
important objective); Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What 
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opinions in Heller and McDonald.39 Under such a framework, courts 
would apply strict scrutiny to any law violating the core rights protected 
by the Second Amendment,40 which Heller seemed to define as the 
right of law-abiding citizens to possess and use weapons in the home for 
lawful purposes—such as self-defense—provided that the weapons are 
in common use for that purpose at the time.41 
                                                                                                                     
 Conversely, under this categorical scheme, the Second Amendment 
would provide little or no protection for certain classes of people, weap-
ons, and uses of firearms that have traditionally been excluded from the 
right to bear arms.42 The Supreme Court stated in Heller, “[N]othing in 
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws for-
bidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . .”43 The Court 
also explained that the prohibition on carrying dangerous and unusual 
weapons “is fairly supported by historical tradition,” and forms a limita-
tion on the right to bear arms.44 Although it is possible that the Court 
will decide to curtail these exceptions in future cases,45 the plurality in 
 
the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 547, 
578–79 (2009) (arguing that courts should adopt from First Amendment jurisprudence a 
framework of categorical exceptions and apply reduced judicial scrutiny to statutes that do 
not violate the core purpose of the right). 
39 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3056 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that deeply rooted 
restrictions on the fundamental right to bear arms may indicate the Second Amendment’s 
scope, as similar traditional restrictions on the freedom of speech indicate the scope of the 
First Amendment); Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to 
protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read 
the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”). 
40 See Anderson, supra note 38, at 579; cf., e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 
529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (using strict scrutiny when reviewing a statute restricting the con-
tent of speech under the First Amendment). 
41 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (discussing limitations on the Second Amendment 
right). 
42 See id. at 595 (recognizing that the Second Amendment does not protect bearing arms 
for any purpose, just as the First Amendment does not protect certain types of speech). In 
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has determined that some categories of speech, 
such as child pornography, are entirely outside the historical protections of the First Amend-
ment. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); United States v. Williams, 553 
U.S. 285, 288 (2008). 
43 554 U.S. at 626–27; cf. Robert L. Tsai, John Brown’s Constitution, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 151, 
161 (2010) (comparing the Second Amendment with the provisional constitution written 
by John Brown—an ardent protector of gun rights—which limited the right to bear arms 
to those of sound mind, good character, and suitable age). 
44 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (approving more narrowly tailored prohibitions than the 
handgun ban at issue). 
45 See id. at 635 (stating, in response to the dissent, that the Court will more fully de-
termine the Second Amendment’s scope in future cases). 
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McDonald repeated its assurances that these traditional reservations 
would not be undone by its recent opinions, and that “incorporation 
does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”46 If the Supreme Court 
indeed decides to borrow from First Amendment jurisprudence, its 
2010 decision in United States v. Stevens suggests that the Court would not 
be willing to recognize new categories of firearms restrictions that exist 
outside of the Second Amendment’s historical tradition.47 
 On the one hand, it seems that the Massachusetts safe storage stat-
ute, which requires that guns be stored in a locked container or bound 
by a trigger lock when not under the control of an authorized user,48 
may be one of the laws imperiled by Heller and McDonald, as it restricts 
the ability of gun owners to quickly access their weapons for self-
defense.49 Furthermore, this mandate extends to guns stored in rooms 
of the home,50 which the Court described in Heller as the place “where 
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”51 Thus, 
the Massachusetts law, which may impair the ability of gun owners to 
defend themselves in their homes and does not implicate any of the 
traditional exceptions to the right to bear arms listed in Heller, seems to 
stand on a weak constitutional foundation.52 
 On the other hand, the statute analyzed in Runyan could be found 
constitutional because it resembles the eighteenth-century laws that 
regulated the storage and discharge of firearms in Boston and other 
cities.53 A majority of the Court in Heller believed that these statutes, 
                                                                                                                      
 
46 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (responding to respondents’ concerns). 
47 See 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (declining to create a new categorical exception to First 
Amendment rights that has not been historically recognized). 
48 Mass Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131L(a) (2008). 
49 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (ruling that a statute requiring guns to be locked at all 
times is unconstitutional because it does not allow for self-defense in the home); Eugene 
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework 
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1534 (2009) (arguing that the few seconds 
lost when unlocking a gun may significantly impair the ability to defend oneself in an 
emergency). 
50 See Commonwealth v. Parzick, 835 N.E.2d 1171, 1175–76 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (de-
termining that an unsecured gun stored in a locked bedroom violates the safe storage 
statute when the door’s lock could be easily picked). 
51 554 U.S. at 628. 
52 See id. at 628–29 (holding that it is unconstitutional to prevent citizens from using 
firearms for self-defense, especially in their homes). 
53 See id. at 631–34 (indicating that colonial statutes restricting the storage and dis-
charge of firearms in various cities—cited in a dissenting opinion to prove a narrower 
scope of the right to bear arms—would comply with the Second Amendment’s individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense if the laws allowed the guns to be loaded and fired to 
confront intruders). Although these laws predate the Bill of Rights, the Court interpreted 
2011 Runyan and the Second Amendment 251 
though prohibiting the storage of loaded firearms in the home, or the 
indiscreet firing of guns within the city, would allow citizens to tempo-
rarily load and discharge firearms to confront intruders in their 
homes.54 The majority implied that if these colonial statutes contained 
exceptions for self-defense, they would comply with the pre-existing, 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense codified in the Second 
Amendment.55 Similarly, the modern safe storage statute in Massachu-
setts, which provides an exception for self-defense, would likely be 
found constitutional.56 In addition, the SJC noted in Runyan that the 
modern Massachusetts safe storage statute is more permissive than 
those of the eighteenth century,57 as the modern law allows gun owners 
to keep their weapons loaded, unlocked, and unsecured on their per-
sons for instantaneous self-defense.58 The colonial safe storage laws, in 
contrast, mandated that firearms be stored unloaded, requiring gun 
owners to load their weapons before firing at an intruder, a process that 
would have taken approximately fifteen seconds for an experienced 
soldier or one minute for someone with less training.59 Modern gun 
owners, however, could release a trigger lock and fire their weapons, 
which may be stored loaded, in less time.60 
 Drawing on the modern Massachusetts safe storage statute’s allow-
ance for self-defense, the SJC distinguished the statute at issue in Run-
yan from the District of Columbia statute invalidated by the Supreme 
Court in Heller, which required firearms to be disassembled or bound 
by a trigger lock at all times when not used for lawful recreational pur-
poses.61 Unlike the District of Columbia law, which did not allow gun 
                                                                                                                      
the Second Amendment as codifying a pre-existing right to bear arms, the scope of which 
was determined by founding era laws. Id. at 592. 
54 Id. at 631–34. 
55 See id. at 633–34 (noting that the colonial laws do not undermine the majority’s 
analysis and do not burden the right to bear arms for self-defense). 
56 See id. at 632–34 (ruling that exceptions for self-defense would make these laws con-
stitutional); see also Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 799 (finding such an exception). 
57 See 922 N.E.2d at 799 n.8 (noting that under the modern safe storage statute, guns 
are more readily accessible for self-defense than under eighteenth-century laws). 
58 Id. at 799. 
59 Id. at 799 n.8 (citing James E. Hicks, United States Military Shoulder Arms, 1795–1935, 
1 Am. Mil. Hist. Found. 23, 30–31 (1937)); accord Heller, 554 U.S. at 685 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (citing Hicks, supra, at 26–30). 
60 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 799 n.8 (dicta); Brief Amicus Curiae of Second Amendment 
Foundation, supra note 16, at 30–31 (stating that the Massachusetts safe storage statute 
allows gun owners to store loaded and operational weapons in quick-release safes, making 
them “readily available to authorized users who know the safe’s keypad code”). 
61 D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 (LexisNexis 2008), invalidated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570; Runyan, 
922 N.E.2d at 799. 
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owners to keep loaded firearms in their homes, even for self-defense, 
the Massachusetts statute allows authorized gun users to keep their 
firearms loaded and unlocked for immediate self-defense in the home, 
provided that the weapon remains within the owner’s control.62 Justice 
Breyer, in his dissent in Heller, remarked that the only issue regarding 
the District of Columbia safe storage statute was “whether the Constitu-
tion requires an exception that would allow someone to render a fire-
arm operational when necessary for self-defense.”63 The majority in 
Heller determined the District of Columbia statute to be unconstitu-
tional because its unequivocal text precluded citizens from rendering 
their firearms operational and using them for the “core lawful purpose 
of self-defense.”64 Conversely, the Massachusetts statute allows citizens 
to keep operable, unlocked, and loaded guns on their persons or to 
unlock their weapons when needed for self-defense.65 Because the Mas-
sachusetts law does not infringe on the core rights protected by the Sec-
ond Amendment,66 it would be found constitutional under any stan-
dard of scrutiny that courts may apply.67 
                                                                                                                     
III. Implications for Other States’ Safe storage Laws 
 If, indeed, the Massachusetts safe storage statute at issue in Runyan 
remains constitutional68 in the wake of the subsequent 2010 Supreme 
Court case McDonald v. City of Chicago,69 it is likely that the safe storage 
statutes adopted by other states will also be held constitutional under 
the Second Amendment.70 Although fourteen states and the District of 
 
 
62 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 799; see also D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 (“[E]ach registrant shall 
keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock 
or similar device unless such firearm is kept at his place of business, or while being used 
for lawful recreational purposes . . . .”). 
63 Heller, 554 U.S. at 692 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 630 (majority opinion). 
65 Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 799. 
66 See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text. 
67 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 (stating that Second Amendment challenges will fail at 
the outset if the law does not burden rights guaranteed by the Amendment). 
68 See supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text. 
69 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion) (incorporating the Second Amend-
ment into the Fourteenth Amendment so that the Second Amendment is fully applicable 
against the states). 
70 See infra notes 79–88 and accompanying text; see also Rachel Shaffer, Note, Child Ac-
cess Prevention Laws: Keeping Guns Out of Our Children’s Hands, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1985, 
1997–98 (2000) (comparing state laws that reduce children’s access to guns); Legal Com-
munity Against Violence, Regulating Guns in America: An Evaluation and Com-
parative Analysis of Federal, State and Selected Local Gun Laws 234–38 (2008), 
http://www.lcav.org/publications-briefs/reports_analyses/RegGuns.entire.report.pdf (last 
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Columbia have adopted statutes that impose criminal liability on per-
sons who negligently store firearms,71 only the Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, and District of Columbia laws impose liability even if a child does 
not access the weapon.72 Of these statutes, the Massachusetts law is cur-
rently the most restrictive, as it is the only one that requires guns to be 
stored in locked containers or bound by trigger locks even when no 
irresponsible person is likely to access them.73 By contrast, most of the-
se statutes impose criminal liability only if a minor gains access to a 
firearm or uses it in a dangerous manner.74 Furthermore, like the Mas-
sachusetts statute,75 many of these safe storage statutes allow for self-
defense in the home, as they do not require guns to be locked when 
carried on the owner’s person.76 If the extraordinarily strict firearm 
storage law from Massachusetts may be found constitutional,77 it is un-
likely that the Second Amendment would render more permissive safe 
storage laws unconstitutional.78 
 Additionally, the safe storage laws of other states will likely remain 
valid under the Second Amendment, as many states already assiduously 
                                                                                                                      
visited Dec. 28, 2010) (reviewing child access prevention laws in twenty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia). 
71 D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Legal Community Against Vio-
lence, supra note 70, at 236. 
72 Legal Community Against Violence, supra note 70, at 236 (listing states); see D.C. 
Code § 7-2507.02(b) (imposing liability for failure to lock guns when the owner knows or 
should know that a child is likely to gain access to the weapon without parental permission); 
Mass Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131L(a) (2008) (imposing liability for failure to lock guns when-
ever not in possession of authorized user); Minn. Stat. § 609.666(2) (2009) (imposing liabil-
ity for negligent storage of a loaded firearm when the user knows or should know that a child 
is likely to gain access). 
73 Compare Mass Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131L(a) (imposing liability for failure to store 
guns in a locked container or bound by a trigger lock whenever not in possession of an 
authorized user), with D.C. Code § 7-2507.02(b) (requiring guns to be stored locked, but 
imposing liability only if the owner knows or should know that a child is likely to gain ac-
cess to the weapon without parental permission), and Minn. Stat. § 609.666(2) (imposing 
liability for negligent storage of a loaded firearm when the person knows or should know 
that a child is likely to gain access and not explicitly requiring the gun be locked). 
74 Legal Community Against Violence, supra note 70, at 236–37. 
75 See Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 799 (recognizing that the Massachusetts safe storage stat-
ute allows for an individual to engage self-defense in the home). 
76 See, e.g., D.C. Code § 7-2507.02(b)(2) (exempting a gun user from liability when 
carrying a firearm on his or her person or in close proximity); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 650–C:1(V)(c) (2007) (stating that liability for negligent storage will not attach if the 
firearm was carried on the person or in close proximity). 
77 See supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text. 
78 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 632 (2008) (stating that the Court’s 
analysis does not “suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to pre-
vent accidents”). 
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protect the right to bear arms.79 Massachusetts is one of only two states 
that have decided that their state constitutions provide only a collective 
right to bear arms for the common defense.80 By contrast, the constitu-
tions of twenty-two states expressly provide an individual right to bear 
arms for self-defense, and eighteen other state constitutions provide, 
either explicitly or through their interpretation, an individual right to 
bear arms that includes self-defense.81 Only six states have no state con-
stitutional provision regarding the right to bear arms,82 and two states 
have not yet determined if their state constitutions provide an individual 
or collective right.83 Prior to the application of the Second Amendment 
against the states in McDonald, Massachusetts was able to proscribe the 
use of guns for individual self-defense.84 In Runyan, however, the SJC 
decided that the Massachusetts safe storage statute allows for individuals 
to use guns for self-defense.85 Furthermore, Massachusetts allows all 
competent, law-abiding, adult citizens to receive licenses to keep non-
high capacity firearms in their homes.86 This suggests that the state pos-
sessed greater legislative authority to regulate firearms than it chose to 
exercise.87 Legislatures would likely be even more respectful of an indi-
vidual’s right to bear arms for self-defense when this right is protected 
by the state’s constitution.88 
                                                                                                                      
79 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Kristin A. Goss, 
Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America 6 (2006)) (suggesting 
that legislators tend to under-regulate guns). 
80 Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & 
Pol. 191, 205 (2006); see also Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Kan. 1975) (quot-
ing City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905)); Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 798 n.5 
(citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976)). 
81 Volokh, supra note 80, at 205. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 205, 207 (citing 1993 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 13 (1993) (construing the right as col-
lective); Opinion No. 05-078, 2006 WL 304006 (2006) (construing the right as individual)); 
see also State v. Mendoza, 920 P.2d 357, 363 & n.9 (Haw. 1996) (expressly declining to de-
cide whether the Hawaiian constitutional provision—identical to the Second Amend-
ment—guarantees an individual or collective right to bear arms). 
84 See Runyan, 922 N.E.2d at 798 & n.5 (holding that the Second Amendment does not 
apply to the states and noting that the Massachusetts Constitution guarantees only a collec-
tive right to bear arms for the common defense). 
85 Id. at 799. 
86 See Mass Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129B (2008) (stating that a firearm identification card 
shall be issued to any non-alien resident over the age of eighteen who has not been convicted 
of specifically listed crimes and does not suffer from a disqualifying mental illness or addic-
tion). 
87 See id.; supra note 79. 
88 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632–33 (stating that because Pennsylvania’s constitution pro-
vided an individual right to bear arms for self-defense, the state would be unlikely to en-
force a ban on the firing of guns in Philadelphia when done in self-defense). 
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Conclusion 
 In the 2010 case Commonwealth v. Runyan, the Massachusetts SJC 
held that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not 
apply against the states. Only three months later, the Supreme Court 
case McDonald v. City of Chicago invalidated that holding. Nevertheless, 
the statute at issue in Runyan, which imposes criminal liability for fail-
ing to store firearms in locked containers when not in the possession of 
a lawfully authorized user, is likely still constitutional. In Runyan, the 
SJC stated in dicta that the Massachusetts safe storage statute does not 
conflict with the core rights protected by the Second Amendment, as it 
allows individuals to bear arms for self-defense in the home. If, indeed, 
the Massachusetts statute is constitutional after McDonald, the safe stor-
age statutes of other states, many of which impose fewer burdens on the 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense, will also be held to com-
ply with the Second Amendment. 
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